Revelation, Consciousness+ and the Phenomenal Powers View

被引:0
作者
Philip Goff
机构
[1] Durham University,
来源
Topoi | 2020年 / 39卷
关键词
Consciousness; Epiphenomenalism; Causal powers; Mind–body problem; Dispositions;
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学科分类号
摘要
Revelation is roughly the thesis that we have introspective access to the essential nature of our conscious states. This thesis is appealed to in arguments against physicalism. Little attention has been given to the problem that Revelation is a source of pressure in the direction of epiphenomenalism, as introspection does not seem to reveal our conscious states as being essentially causal. I critique Hedda Hassel Mørch’s ‘phenomenal powers view’ response to this difficulty, before defending a form of the ‘consciousness+’ response.
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页码:1089 / 1092
页数:3
相关论文
共 4 条
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[2]  
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[3]  
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[4]  
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