The questioning-attitude account of agnosticism

被引：0
作者：
Avery Archer
机构：
[1] The George Washington University,Department of Philosophy
来源：
Synthese | / 200卷
关键词：
Agnosticism; Questioning-attitude account; Question-directed attitude account; Suspension of judgement; Withholding judgement;
D O I：
暂无
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
I defend a proposition-directed, sui generis account of agnosticism, according to which being agnostic about some proposition, P, involves a sceptical or questioning mental stance towards both the truth and falsity of P. Call this the questioning-attitude account. The questioning-attitude account contrasts with the question-directed attitude account of Jane Friedman, which holds that the object of agnosticism is a question rather than a proposition. I argue that the questioning-attitude account not only avoids a major weakness of Friedman’s question-directed attitude account, but it also displays the following three attractive features: (1) it offers an explanation of why ascriptions of agnosticism often take an interrogative compliment, (2) it offers a univocal account of the content of all three doxastic attitudes, and (3) it fleshes out the claim that agnosticism is sui generis by describing what makes agnosticism distinct from both belief and disbelief.
引用
收藏
相关论文
共 16 条
  • [1] Archer A(2018)Wondering about what you know Analysis 78 596-604
  • [2] Archer A(2019)Agnosticism, inquiry, and unanswerable questions Disputatio 53 63-88
  • [3] Cassam Q(2010)Judging, believing and thinking Philosophical Issues 20 80-95
  • [4] Friedman J(2013)Question-directed attitudes Philosophical Perspectives 27 145-174
  • [5] Friedman J(2013)Suspended judgement Philosophical Studies 162 165-181
  • [6] Friedman J(2017)Why suspend judging? Nous 51 302-326
  • [7] Hieronymi P(2006)Controlling attitudes Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 45-74
  • [8] Kapitan T(1986)Deliberation and the presumption of open alternatives The Philosophical Quarterly 36 230-251
  • [9] Kaplan M(1981)A Bayesian theory of rational acceptance The Journal of Philosophy 78 305-330
  • [10] Lilly W(2019)Constitutive reasons and the suspension of judgement Dialogue 58 215-224
12