Constitutions as self-enforcing redistributive schemes

被引：1

作者：

Filipovich D. ^{[1
]}

Sempere J. ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] CEE, El Colegio de Mexico, Mexico

来源：

Economics of Governance | 2008年 / 9卷 / 2期

关键词：

Anarchy; Constitutions; Redistribution; Self-enforcement;

D O I：

10.1007/s10101-006-0027-7

中图分类号：

学科分类号：

摘要：

We present a model of a fiscal constitution (i.e., a transfer scheme between income classes) that is self-enforcing against a background in which predatory activities ('revolutions') are feasible. In this environment, a constitution self-enforces by structuring society's interests in such a way that non- compliance necessarily results in a revolution which society would rather avoid. © 2006 Springer-Verlag.

引用

页码：103 / 129

页数：26