Constitutions as self-enforcing redistributive schemes

被引：1
|
作者：
Filipovich D. [1 ]
Sempere J. [1 ]
机构：
[1] CEE, El Colegio de Mexico, Mexico
来源：
Economics of Governance | 2008年 / 9卷 / 2期
关键词：
Anarchy; Constitutions; Redistribution; Self-enforcement;
D O I：
10.1007/s10101-006-0027-7
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
We present a model of a fiscal constitution (i.e., a transfer scheme between income classes) that is self-enforcing against a background in which predatory activities ('revolutions') are feasible. In this environment, a constitution self-enforces by structuring society's interests in such a way that non- compliance necessarily results in a revolution which society would rather avoid. © 2006 Springer-Verlag.
引用
收藏
页码：103 / 129
页数：26
相关论文
共 22 条
  • [1] Self-enforcing coalitions with power accumulation
    Karl Jandoc
    Ruben Juarez
    International Journal of Game Theory, 2017, 46 : 327 - 355
  • [2] Self-enforcing coalitions with power accumulation
    Jandoc, Karl
    Juarez, Ruben
    INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY, 2017, 46 (02) : 327 - 355
  • [3] An Experimental Study of Self-Enforcing Coalitions
    Jandoc, Karl
    Juarez, Ruben
    GAMES, 2019, 10 (03):
  • [4] Self-enforcing arrangements in African political economy
    Leeson, PT
    JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION, 2005, 57 (02) : 241 - 244
  • [5] Domestic policies in self-enforcing trade agreements
    Saure, Philip
    EUROPEAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 2014, 68 : 19 - 30
  • [6] Additionality When REDD Contracts Must be Self-Enforcing
    Salas, Paula Cordero
    Roe, Brian E.
    Sohngen, Brent
    ENVIRONMENTAL & RESOURCE ECONOMICS, 2018, 69 (01): : 195 - 215
  • [7] Additionality When REDD Contracts Must be Self-Enforcing
    Paula Cordero Salas
    Brian E. Roe
    Brent Sohngen
    Environmental and Resource Economics, 2018, 69 : 195 - 215
  • [8] Generalized consistent ranking and the formation of self-enforcing coalitions
    Jandoc, Karl
    Juarez, Ruben
    REVIEW OF ECONOMIC DESIGN, 2024, 28 (01) : 69 - 88
  • [9] Generalized consistent ranking and the formation of self-enforcing coalitions
    Karl Jandoc
    Ruben Juarez
    Review of Economic Design, 2024, 28 : 69 - 88
  • [10] Co-Utility: Self-Enforcing protocols for the mutual benefit of participants
    Domingo-Ferrer, Josep
    Martinez, Sergio
    Sanchez, David
    Soria-Comas, Jordi
    ENGINEERING APPLICATIONS OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, 2017, 59 : 148 - 158
123