Core extensions for non-balanced TU-games

被引：0
作者：
Camelia Bejan
Juan Camilo Gómez
机构：
[1] Rice University MS-22,Department of Economics
[2] University of Washington-Bothell,Business Administration Program
来源：
International Journal of Game Theory | 2009年 / 38卷
关键词：
Core extensions; Efficiency; Taxation; Public goods; C71; H21; H41;
D O I：
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中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
A family of core extensions for cooperative TU-games is introduced. These solution concepts are non-empty when applied to non-balanced games yet coincide with the core whenever the core is non-empty. The extensions suggest how an exogenous regulator can sustain a stable and efficient outcome, financing a subsidy via individual taxes. Economic and geometric properties of the solution concepts are studied. When taxes are proportional, the proportional prenucleolus is proposed as a single-valued selection device. An application of these concepts to the decentralization of a public goods economy is discussed.
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