Evolutionary game on oil and gas companies’ pollution treatment

被引：0

作者：

Zhang T. ^{[1
]}

Guo C. ^{[1
]}

Quan L. ^{[2
]}

Fu F. ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] School of Economics & Management, China University of Petroleum (East China), Shandong, 266580, Qingdao

[2] School of Marxism, Shanghai Jiaotong University, Shanghai

来源：

Journal of Shanghai Jiaotong University (Science) | 2016年 / 21卷 / 6期

关键词：

evolutionary game; oil and gas companies; policy suggestions; pollution treatment;

D O I：

10.1007/s12204-016-1790-4

中图分类号：

学科分类号：

摘要：

This paper presents a dynamic model of pollution treatment strategies, driven by the bargaining relationships between governments, oil and gas companies and local residents. The results show that government plays a dominating role and government environmental policies have significant impact on other two parties’ behavior. To achieve better pollution treatment in the future, we put forward the following suggestions. An improvement in the legal system is required, and the legal enforcement needs to be strengthened. In terms of pollution treatment, responsibilities and obligations of these three parties need to be clearly defined. A wellfunctioned reward and penalties system needs to be established for minimizing the environment damage in the future. © 2016, Shanghai Jiaotong University and Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg.

引用

页码：750 / 756

页数：6

共 10 条

[1] List B.J., Mason C.F., Optimal institutional arrangements for transboundary pollutants in a secondbest world: Evidence from a differential game with asymmetric players [J], Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 42, 3, pp. 277-296, (2001)
[2] Jorgensen S., Zaccour G., Time consistent side payments in a dynamic game of downstream pollution [J], Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 25, 12, pp. 1973-1987, (2001)
[3] Yeung D.W.K., Dynamically consistent cooperative solution in a differential game of transboundary industrial pollution [J], Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, 134, 1, pp. 143-160, (2007)
[4] Yeung D., A differential game of industrial pollution management [J], Annals of Operations Research, 37, 1, pp. 297-311, (1992)
[5] Breton M., Zaccour G., Zahaf M., A differential game of joint implementation of environmental projects [J], Automatica, 41, 10, pp. 1174-1737, (2005)
[6] Feenstra T., Kort P.M., Zeeuw A.D., Environmental policy instruments in an international duopoly with feedback investment strategies [J], Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 25, 10, pp. 1665-1687, (2001)
[7] Wu R.M., Hu D.P., Shen H.Z., Stability analysis of the evolutionary game of river valley’s pollution treatment [J], Journal of Systems & Management, 6, pp. 797-801, (2013)
[8] Hofbauer J., Sandholm W.H., Evolution in games with randomly disturbed payoffs [J], Journal of Economic Theory, 132, 1, pp. 47-69, (2007)
[9] Huisman P., Jong J.D., Wieriks K., Transboundary cooperation in shared river basins: Experiences from the Rhine, Meuse and North Sea [J], Water Policy, 2, 1-2, pp. 83-97, (2000)
[10] Skinner M.W., Joseph A.E., Kuhn R.G., Social and environmental regulation in rural China: Bringing the changing role of local government into focus [J], Geoforum, 34, 2, pp. 267-281, (2003)

← 1 →