Profit-sharing licensing

被引:0
作者
Shuai Niu
机构
[1] Shandong University,School of Economics
来源
Journal of Economics | 2017年 / 121卷
关键词
Technology; Equity; Licensing; Welfare; Policy; L13; L24; L41;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
学科分类号
摘要
Profit-sharing licensing is quite a common business practice. In a Cournot duopoly model, we showed that if not subject to any restrictions this kind of technology for equity deal would lead to a decline in industry output and hurt consumers. To avoid the industry output contraction and protect the interests of consumers, the government can intervene in licensing by requiring that the profit-sharing rate specified by a licensing contract should not exceed the percentage difference of involved firms’ equilibrium outputs before licensing.
引用
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页码:267 / 278
页数:11
相关论文
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