Austrian Economics and Compatibilist Freedom

被引：0
作者：
Igor Wysocki
Łukasz Dominiak
机构：
[1] Nicolaus Copernicus University,The Interdisciplinary Doctoral School of Social Sciences (Academia Rerum Socialum)
[2] Nicolaus Copernicus University,Faculty of Philosophy and Social Sciences
来源：
Journal for General Philosophy of Science | 2024年 / 55卷
关键词：
Austrian economics; compatibilism; metaphysical libertarianism;
D O I：
暂无
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
The present paper probes the relation between the metaphysics of human freedom and the Rothbardian branch of Austrian economics. It transpires that Rothbard and his followers embrace metaphysical libertarianism, which holds that free will is incompatible with determinism and that the thesis of determinism is false as pertaining to human action. However, as we demonstrate, their economics with its reliance on value scales requires for its tenability compatibilist freedom. Moreover, we attempt to show that the notion of value scales (or preferences) postulated by them implies that value scales are determinative of choices people make. We contend that it is for this reason that the said Austrians should jettison their metaphysical libertarianism.
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页码：113 / 136
页数：23
相关论文
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