On Different Ways of Being Equal

被引：0
作者：
Bruno Bentzen
机构：
[1] Carnegie Mellon University,Department of Philosophy
来源：
Erkenntnis | 2022年 / 87卷
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摘要：
The aim of this paper is to present a constructive solution to Frege’s puzzle (largely limited to the mathematical context) based on type theory. Two ways in which an equality statement may be said to have cognitive significance are distinguished. One concerns the mode of presentation of the equality, the other its mode of proof. Frege’s distinction between sense and reference, which emphasizes the former aspect, cannot adequately explain the cognitive significance of equality statements unless a clear identity criterion for senses is provided. It is argued that providing a solution based on proofs is more satisfactory from the standpoint of constructive semantics.
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页码：1809 / 1830
页数：21
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