Agency theory: choice-based foundations of the parametrized distribution formulation

被引：0
作者：
Edi Karni
机构：
[1] Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics
来源：
Economic Theory | 2008年 / 36卷
关键词：
Agency theory; Contract theory; Moral hazard; D81; D82;
D O I：
暂无
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
This paper develops choice-theoretic foundations of the principal’s and the agent’s behaviors underlying the parametrized distribution formulation of agency theory. Both the principal and the agent are expected-utility maximizers and their action-dependent subjective probabilities are defined directly on the outcomes. The results are used to evaluate and interpret the common prior assumption.
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页码：337 / 351
页数：14
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