Evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations

被引：3
作者：
Christine Taylor
Drew Fudenberg
Akira Sasaki
Martin A. Nowak
机构：
[1] Massachusetts Institute of Technology,Department of Mathematics
[2] Harvard University,Department of Economics
[3] Kyushu University,Faculty of Science, Department of Biology
[4] Harvard University,Program for Evolutionary Dynamics
来源：
Bulletin of Mathematical Biology | 2004年 / 66卷
关键词：
Payoff; Evolutionary Game; Game Dynamic; Finite Population; Payoff Matrix;
D O I：
暂无
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
We introduce a model of stochastic evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations which is similar to the familiar replicator dynamics for infinite populations. Our focus is on the conditions for selection favoring the invasion and/or fixation of new phenotypes. For infinite populations, there are three generic selection scenarios describing evolutionary game dynamics among two strategies. For finite populations, there are eight selection scenarios. For a fixed payoff matrix a number of these scenarios can occur for different population sizes. We discuss several examples with unexpected behavior.
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页码：1621 / 1644
页数：23
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