Company taxation and merger incentives in international oligopoly: On international policy coordination with strategic trade

被引:2
作者
Lommerud K.E. [1 ]
Olsen T.E. [2 ]
Straume O.R. [1 ,3 ]
机构
[1] Department of Economics, University of Bergen, 5007 Bergen
[2] Department of Finance and Management Science, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration, 5045 Bergen
[3] Department of Economics, University of Minho (NIPE), 4710-057 Braga, Campus de Gualtar
关键词
Endogenous merger; Policy coordination; Strategic trade policy; Two-part taxation;
D O I
10.1007/s10842-009-0060-7
中图分类号
学科分类号
摘要
We analyse how national taxation of firms is likely to affect merger incentives in international markets. In particular, we ask whether non-coordinated trade policies stimulate cross-border mergers that are overall inefficient, and if this then is an argument for international coordination of such policies? We address this issue in a setting where policy makers use two-part tariffs to tax exporting firms. The analysis reveals that while non-coordinated policies may induce cross-border mergers by allowing the firms in question to play national policy makers out against each other, this can nevertheless be overall welfare enhancing compared to market outcomes under coordinated policy making. © Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2009.
引用
收藏
页码:161 / 186
页数:25
相关论文
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