Welfare improving ignorance and negligence rule

被引:0
作者
Bruno Deffains
Laurent Franckx
机构
[1] EconomiX,Department Strategic Policy Advice
[2] CNRS and University of Paris Ouest,undefined
[3] ARCADIS Belgium nv,undefined
来源
European Journal of Law and Economics | 2009年 / 28卷
关键词
Liability rules; Information; Ignorance; Negligence; K13;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
学科分类号
摘要
The literature considers that the ignorance of activity levels by the courts is a major source of inefficiency to minimize the social costs of accidents. In this paper, we show that the inefficiency of the negligence rule based on a standard of care (and correlatively ignoring the activity level) is not established if certain dimensions of care are not verifiable. In other words, if care and activity levels are the only relevant variables of the injurer's set of actions to reduce the risk of accident, it is true that inefficiency arises when the court ignores one element of this set. But, considering that some dimensions of care are in practice not verifiable, it can be efficient for the judge not to take into account the activity level of the defendant. We propose a simple model with three variables: observable and unobservable precautionary measures and activity level.
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页码:1 / 7
页数:6
相关论文
共 6 条
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