General Properties of Long-Run Supergames

被引：0
作者：
Jérôme Renault
Tristan Tomala
机构：
[1] (GREMAQ,TSE
[2] Université Toulouse 1 Capitole),Economics and Decision Sciences Department
[3] HEC Paris,undefined
来源：
Dynamic Games and Applications | 2011年 / 1卷
关键词：
Repeated games; Signals; Folk theorem;
D O I：
暂无
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
Supergames are repeated games in which a fixed known finite one-shot game is repeated over and over. Information about the actions chosen at each stage is provided by a signalling technology. This paper studies the main properties that are valid over this whole class of games and both surveys known results and provides new ones.
引用
收藏
页码：319 / 350
页数：31
相关论文
共 61 条
  • [1] Abreu D(1990)Toward a theory of discounted repeated games with imperfect monitoring Econometrica 58 1041-1063
  • [2] Pearce D(1974)Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies J Math Econ 1 67-96
  • [3] Stacchetti E(1996)Communication in repeated games with private monitoring J Econ Theory 70 281-297
  • [4] Aumann RJ(1985)Finitely repeated games Econometrica 53 905-922
  • [5] Ben-Porath E(1987)Nash equilibria of finitely repeated games Int J Game Theory 16 197-204
  • [6] Kahneman M(2005)Belief-free equilibria in repeated games Econometrica 73 377-415
  • [7] Benoit J-P(1986)An approach to communication equilibria Econometrica 54 1375-1385
  • [8] Krishna V(1986)A counterexample to the Folk theorem with discounting Econ Lett 20 7-7
  • [9] Benoit J-P(1991)An approximate Folk theorem with imperfect private information J Econ Theory 54 26-47
  • [10] Krishna V(1994)Efficiency and observability with long-run and short-run players J Econ Theory 62 103-135
1234567