Wisdom Beyond Rationality: A Reply to Ryan

被引：0
|
作者：
Iskra Fileva
Jon Tresan
机构：
[1] University of North Carolina,Charles Koch Fellow and Faculty Fellow of the Parr Center for Ethics
[2] Chapel Hill,Visiting Scholar
[3] University of North Carolina,undefined
来源：
Acta Analytica | 2013年 / 28卷
关键词：
Wisdom; Rationality; Judgment; Value conflicts; Virtue;
D O I：
暂无
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
We discuss Sharon Ryan’s Deep Rationality Theory of wisdom, defended recently in her “Wisdom, Knowledge and Rationality.” We argue that (a) Ryan’s use of the term “rationality” needs further elaboration; (b) there is a problem with requiring that the wise person possesses justified beliefs but not necessarily knowledge; (c) the conditions of DRT are not all necessary; (d) the conditions are not sufficient. At the end of our discussion, we suggest that there may be a problem with the very assumption that an informative, non-circular set of necessary and sufficient conditions of wisdom can be given.
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页码：229 / 235
页数：6
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