Conditionals and indexical relativism

被引：0

作者：

Brian Weatherson

机构：

[1] Rutgers University,Department of Philosophy

来源：

Synthese | 2009年 / 166卷

关键词：

Conditionals; Relativism; Variable binding;

D O I：

暂无

中图分类号：

学科分类号：

摘要：

I set out and defend a view on indicative conditionals that I call “indexical relativism”. The core of the view is that which proposition is (semantically) expressed by an utterance of a conditional is a function of (among other things) the speaker’s context and the assessor’s context. This implies a kind of relativism, namely that a single utterance may be correctly assessed as true by one assessor and false by another.

引用

页码：333 / 357

页数：24

共 11 条

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[2]

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[3]

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[4]

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[5]

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[6]

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[8]

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[10]

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