Numerous product quality scandals are caused by low-quality inputs. When input quality is not perfectly observed by downstream firms, upstream firms often have moral hazard problems. If vertical integration does not directly eliminate the moral hazard problems, does vertical integration still improve product quality? If so, under which conditions? We find that given the precision of monitoring technology used by downstream firms, when the level of public monitoring is very high or very low, downstream firms have no incentive to integrate upstream firms; when the level is intermediate, downstream firms have incentives to integrate and vertical integration increases product quality.
机构:
Univ Michigan, Stephen M Ross Sch Business, Dept Strategy, Ann Arbor, MI 48109 USAUniv Michigan, Stephen M Ross Sch Business, Dept Strategy, Ann Arbor, MI 48109 USA
Zhou, Yue Maggie
Wan, Xiang
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Ohio State Univ, Fisher Coll Business, Dept Mkt & Logist, Columbus, OH 43210 USAUniv Michigan, Stephen M Ross Sch Business, Dept Strategy, Ann Arbor, MI 48109 USA
机构:
Univ Nova Lisboa, Fac Ciencias & Tecnol, CEFAGE UE, P-1200 Lisbon, PortugalUniv Nova Lisboa, Fac Ciencias & Tecnol, CEFAGE UE, P-1200 Lisbon, Portugal
Brito, Duarte
Pereira, Pedro
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Univ Nova Lisboa, Fac Ciencias & Tecnol, CEFAGE UE, P-1200 Lisbon, PortugalUniv Nova Lisboa, Fac Ciencias & Tecnol, CEFAGE UE, P-1200 Lisbon, Portugal
Pereira, Pedro
Vareda, Joao
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Univ Nova Lisboa, Fac Ciencias & Tecnol, CEFAGE UE, P-1200 Lisbon, PortugalUniv Nova Lisboa, Fac Ciencias & Tecnol, CEFAGE UE, P-1200 Lisbon, Portugal
Vareda, Joao
B E JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS & POLICY,
2012,
12
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