Verifiability, incomplete contracts and dispute resolution

被引：0

作者：

Zhang J.Z. ^{[1
]}

Tian Z.H.U. ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Department of Economics, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL

[2] Division of Social Science, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Kowloon, Clear Water Bay

来源：

European Journal of Law and Economics | 2000年 / 9卷 / 3期

关键词：

Dispute resolution; Holdup; Incomplete contracts; Unverifiability;

D O I：

10.1023/A:1018753205977

中图分类号：

学科分类号：

摘要：

Recent literature on incomplete contracts attributes noncontractibility of certain contingencies to their unverifiability. This paper questions the underlying assumption of this theory and argues that the court (or arbitrator) need not observe relevant contingencies with the same degree of accuracy as the contracting parties in order to enforce a contingent contract. In a simple procurement model, it is shown that as long as the ruling of the court (arbitrator) is not arbitrary, the first-best outcome can be implemented under certain ideal conditions by a contingent contract even if contingencies are costly to verify and verification is imperfect. © 2000 Kluwer Academic Publishers.

引用

页码：281 / 290

页数：9

共 18 条

[1]

Aghion P., Bolton P., An incomplete contracts approach to financial contracting, Review of Economic Studies, 59, pp. 473-494, (1992)

[2]

Aghion P., Dewatripont M., Rey P., Renegotiation design with unverifiable information, Econometrica, 62, pp. 257-282, (1994)

[3]

Ashenfelter O., Arbitration Behavior, American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings, 77, pp. 342-346, (1987)

[4]

Aumann R., Agreeing to disagree, The Annals of Statistics, 6, pp. 1236-1239, (1976)

[5]

Benson B., To arbitrate or to litigate: That is the question, European Journal of Law and Economics, 8, pp. 91-151, (1999)

[6]

Bloom D., Cavanagh C., An analysis of the selection of arbitrators, American Economic Review, 76, pp. 408-422, (1986)

[7]

Che Y., Hausch D., Cooperative investments and the value of contracting, American Economic Review, 89, pp. 125-147, (1999)

[8]

Chung T., Incomplete contracts, specific investments, and risk sharing, Review of Economic Studies, 58, pp. 1031-1042, (1991)

[9]

Edlin A., Reichelstein S., Holdups, standard breach remedies, and optimal investment, American Economic Review, 86, pp. 478-501, (1996)

[10]

Fudenberg D., Tirole J., Game Theory, (1991)

← 1 2 →