Elections and strategic positioning games

被引：0

作者：

Frank H. Page Jr

Myrna H. Wooders

机构：

[1] Department of Finance, University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa

[2] Department of Economics, University of Warwick

来源：

Review of Economic Design | 2003年 / 8卷 / 1期

关键词：

Farsighted stability; Political common agency games;

D O I：

10.1007/s10058-003-0093-z

中图分类号：

学科分类号：

摘要：

We formalize the interplay between expected voting behavior and strategic positioning behavior of candidates as a common agency problem in which the candidates (i.e., the principals) compete for voters (i.e., agents) via the issues they choose and the positions they take. A political situation is defined as a feasible combination of candidate positions and expected political payoffs to the candidates. Taking this approach, we are led naturally to a particular formalization of the candidates' positioning game, called a political situation game. Within the context of this game, we define the notion of farsighted stability (introduced in an abstract setting by Chwe 1994) and apply Chwe's result to obtain existence of farsightedly stable outcomes. We compute the farsightedly stable sets for several examples of political situations games, with outcomes that conform to real-world observations.

引用

页码：63 / 83

页数：20

共 14 条

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