Replies to commentators on A Virtue Epistemology (Oxford University Press, 2007)

被引:0
作者
Ernest Sosa
机构
[1] Rutgers,
[2] The State University of New Jersey,undefined
来源
Philosophical Studies | 2009年 / 144卷
关键词
Virtue epistemology; Dreams; Knowledge; Skepticism; Apt belief; Animal knowledge; Reflective knowledge;
D O I
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学科分类号
摘要
Paul Boghossian discusses critically my account of intuition as a source of epistemic status. Stewart Cohen takes up my views on skepticism, on dreams, and on epistemic competence and competences and their relation to human knowledge. Hilary Kornblith focuses on my animal/reflective distinction, and, along with Cohen, on my comparison between how dreams might mislead us and how other bad epistemic contexts can do so. In this paper I offer replies to my three critics.
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页码:137 / 147
页数:10
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