Once More on Intergenerational Discounting in Climate-Change Analysis: Reply to Partha Dasgupta

Discounting the utilities of future generations in many problems, such as climate-change analysis, has several justifications, only one of which can be supported by ethics which postulate that every individual, no matter when born, has an equal right to well-being. That justification is that future generations may not exist. In an earlier article published here, I explained this view, and criticized economists who deviate from it: the practical aspect of this deviation is to choose discount rates which are far too high, thus relegating future generations to lower utility than they a priori have a right to. As well, many economists continue to rely upon a utilitarian ethic, a reliance which is independent of the discounting issue, but which I also criticize. Dasgupta responded to my article; the present article is a response to Dasgupta.