Hill on phenomenal consciousness

被引:0
|
作者
Brian P. McLaughlin
机构
[1] Rutgers University,Department of Philosophy
来源
Philosophical Studies | 2016年 / 173卷
关键词
Phenomenal consciousness; Qualia; Representationalism; Type materialism;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
学科分类号
摘要
I argue that it is at least open to a proponent of type materialism for phenomenal consciousness to accept Hill’s representational theory of experiential awareness of perceptual qualia.
引用
收藏
页码:851 / 860
页数:9
相关论文
共 50 条
  • [31] Is phenomenal consciousness really a special case in science?
    Gartner, Klaus
    Cordovil, Joao L.
    FRONTIERS IN PSYCHOLOGY, 2024, 15
  • [32] Experiencing without knowing? Empirical evidence for phenomenal consciousness without access
    Amir, Yoni Zion
    Assaf, Yaniv
    Yovel, Yossi
    Mudrik, Liad
    COGNITION, 2023, 238
  • [33] DOES THE FOLK CONCEPT OF PHENOMENAL CONSCIOUSNESS EXIST?
    Wyewa, Michal
    DIAMETROS, 2022, 19 (71): : 46 - 66
  • [34] Resilient architectures to facilitate both functional consciousness and phenomenal consciousness in machines
    Ramamurthy, Uma
    Franklin, Stan
    International Journal of Machine Consciousness, 2009, 1 (02) : 243 - 253
  • [35] Tonic immobility and phenomenal consciousness in animals: a review
    Woodruff, Michael L.
    FRONTIERS IN PSYCHOLOGY, 2025, 16
  • [36] Phenomenal consciousness with infallible self-representation
    Kidd, Chad
    PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES, 2011, 152 (03) : 361 - 383
  • [37] Sentience, Vulcans, and zombies: the value of phenomenal consciousness
    Shepherd, Joshua
    AI & SOCIETY, 2024, 39 (6) : 3005 - 3015
  • [38] Can Computational Intelligence Model Phenomenal Consciousness?
    Garrido Merchan, Eduardo C.
    Lumbreras, Sara
    PHILOSOPHIES, 2023, 8 (04)
  • [39] Having Experience and Knowing Experience: A Case for Illusionism about Phenomenal Consciousness
    Shabasson, Daniel
    ARGUMENTA, 2024,
  • [40] A global workspace model for phenomenal and access consciousness
    Raffone, Antonino
    Pantani, Martina
    CONSCIOUSNESS AND COGNITION, 2010, 19 (02) : 580 - 596