Hill on phenomenal consciousness

被引:0
|
作者
Brian P. McLaughlin
机构
[1] Rutgers University,Department of Philosophy
来源
Philosophical Studies | 2016年 / 173卷
关键词
Phenomenal consciousness; Qualia; Representationalism; Type materialism;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
学科分类号
摘要
I argue that it is at least open to a proponent of type materialism for phenomenal consciousness to accept Hill’s representational theory of experiential awareness of perceptual qualia.
引用
收藏
页码:851 / 860
页数:9
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