Imperfect recall and the relationships between solution concepts in extensive games

被引：0
|
作者：
Jeffrey Jude Kline
机构：
[1] Bond University,Department of Economics, School of Business
来源：
Economic Theory | 2005年 / 25卷
关键词：
Memory; Imperfect recall; Extensive games; Solutions.;
D O I：
暂无
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
In a game of imperfect recall, a sequential equilibrium may not be a Nash equilibrium, and a perfect equilibrium may not be a sequential equilibrium. Sufficiency conditions weaker than perfect recall are given to ensure the standard relationships hold between perfect equilibrium, sequential equilibrium and Nash equilibrium.
引用
收藏
页码：703 / 710
页数：7
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