Quality target negotiation in health care: evidence from the English NHS

被引：0
作者：
Eleonora Fichera
Hugh Gravelle
Mario Pezzino
Matt Sutton
机构：
[1] University of Manchester,Manchester Centre for Health Economics
[2] University of York,Centre for Health Economics
[3] University of Manchester,Economics, School of Social Sciences
来源：
The European Journal of Health Economics | 2016年 / 17卷
关键词：
Contracts; Quality; Financial incentives; Pay for performance; Hospitals; Nash bargaining; I11; I18; L51; C35;
D O I：
暂无
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
We examine how public sector third-party purchasers and hospitals negotiate quality targets when a fixed proportion of hospital revenue is required to be linked to quality. We develop a bargaining model linking the number of quality targets to purchaser and hospital characteristics. Using data extracted from 153 contracts for acute hospital services in England in 2010/2011, we find that the number of quality targets is associated with the purchaser’s population health and its budget, the hospital type, whether the purchaser delegated negotiation to an agency, and the quality targets imposed by the supervising regional health authority.
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页码：811 / 822
页数：11
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