Uncoupled automata and pure Nash equilibria

被引：0

作者：

Yakov Babichenko

机构：

[1] The Hebrew University of Jerusalem,Center for Study of Rationality and The Institute of Mathematics

来源：

International Journal of Game Theory | 2010年 / 39卷

关键词：

Automaton; Nash equilibrium; Uncoupledness;

D O I：

暂无

中图分类号：

学科分类号：

摘要：

We study the problem of reaching a pure Nash equilibrium in multi-person games that are repeatedly played, under the assumption of uncoupledness: EVERY player knows only his own payoff function. We consider strategies that can be implemented by finite-state automata, and characterize the minimal number of states needed in order to guarantee that a pure Nash equilibrium is reached in every game where such an equilibrium exists.

引用

页码：483 / 502

页数：19