“Kripkenstein” in Legal Interpretation

被引：0

作者：

Clément Labi

机构：

[1] University of Luxembourg,

来源：

International Journal for the Semiotics of Law - Revue internationale de Sémiotique juridique | 2020年 / 33卷

关键词：

Legal interpretation; Legal logic; Kripkenstein; Wittgenstein; Philosophy of language;

D O I：

暂无

中图分类号：

学科分类号：

摘要：

Saul Kripke, commenting on Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations (his idiosyncratic understanding of Wittgenstein’s work came to be known as Kripkenstein), relates the following thought experiment: let us suppose that one has never added numbers greater than 50 before. A “bizarre sceptic” could argue that there is no hard evidence against the hypothesis that it has only ever been meant for instance, that:if x, y < 57, x “plus” y = x + yif x, y ≥ 57, x “plus” y = 5

引用

页码：1059 / 1072

页数：13