Strategic delegation in oligopolistic tournaments

被引：4
作者：
Kräkel M. [1 ]
机构：
[1] Department of Economics, BWL II, University of Bonn, 53113 Bonn
来源：
Review of Economic Design | 2005年 / 9卷 / 4期
关键词：
Managerial incentives; Oligopoly; Strategic delegation; Tournaments;
D O I：
10.1007/s10058-005-0136-8
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
This paper considers a two-stage game with two owners and two managers. At the first stage, the owners choose a linear combination of profits and sales as incentives for their managers. At the second stage, the two managers compete in an oligopolistic tournament against each other. The findings substantially differ from the results for Cournot or Bertrand oligopoly: There exist asymmetric equilibria where one owner puts a positive weight on sales and the other a negative one, although the structure of the game is completely symmetric. If the influence of noise vanishes, the owner of the more aggressive firm will even induce sales maximization to his manager in order to preempt his competitor. © Springer-Verlag 2005.
引用
收藏
页码：377 / 396
页数：19
相关论文
共 36 条
  • [1] Bagwell K., Commitment and observability in games, Games and Economic Behavior, 8, pp. 271-280, (1995)
  • [2] Baik K.H., Kim I.-G., Delegation in contests, European Journal of Political Economy, 13, pp. 281-298, (1997)
  • [3] Baye M.R., Hoppe H., The strategic equivalence of rent-seeking, innovation, and patent-race games, Games and Economic Behavior, 44, pp. 217-226, (2003)
  • [4] Baye M.R., Kovenock D., De Vries C.G., The all-pay auction with complete information, Economic Theory, 8, pp. 291-305, (1996)
  • [5] Besen S.M., Farrell J., Choosing how to compete: Strategies and tactics in standardization, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 8, 2, pp. 117-131, (1994)
  • [6] Bonanno G., Deterrence, observability and awareness, Economic Notes, 21, pp. 307-315, (1992)
  • [7] Bulow J., Geanakoplos J., Klemperer P., Multimarket oligopoly: Strategic substitutes and complements, Journal of Political Economy, 93, pp. 488-511, (1985)
  • [8] Chen K.-P., Sabotage in promotion tournaments, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 19, pp. 119-140, (2003)
  • [9] Dixit A., Strategic behavior in contests, American Economic Review, 77, pp. 891-898, (1987)
  • [10] Drago R., Garvey G.T., Turnbull G.K., A collective tournament, Economics Letters, 50, pp. 223-227, (1996)
1234