An optimal investor-state dispute settlement mechanism

被引：0
作者：
Frank Stähler
机构：
[1] University of Adelaide,
[2] University of Tübingen,undefined
[3] CESifo and NoCet,undefined
来源：
Journal of Economics | 2023年 / 138卷
关键词：
Investor state dispute settlement; Foreign direct investment; TTIP; TPP; F21; F23; F53; F55; D82; H13;
D O I：
暂无
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
Many investment treaties include investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) provisions which are supposed to protect a foreign investor against opportunistic behavior of a host country. This paper scrutinizes the optimal design of ISDS provisions that solve the holdup problem. It shows that an efficient investor protection mechanism requires an arbitrator as established in investment treaties. However, this arbitrator does neither have to learn nor to evaluate the circumstances of the dispute. Furthermore, any ISDS compensation from the government to the investor should not be based on reductions in investor profits but on the host country’s welfare effects.
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页码：1 / 16
页数：15
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