Allocation of decision rights among two parties with asymmetric bargaining powers in bidirectional open innovation

被引：0

作者：

Takaya Kubota

Shin’ya Okuda

机构：

[1] Faculty of Business Administration, Tohoku Gakuin University, 1-3-1 Tsuchitoi, Aoba, Miyagi, Sendai

[2] School of Data Science, Nagoya City University, 1, Kawasumi, Mizuho-Cho, Mizuho-Ku, Nagoya

来源：

SN Business & Economics | / 3卷 / 6期

基金：

日本学术振兴会;

关键词：

Bargaining; Decision rights; Incentive; Incomplete contract; Open innovation;

D O I：

10.1007/s43546-023-00473-w

中图分类号：

学科分类号：

摘要：

This study explores the allocation of decision rights between two parties with different bargaining powers in a bidirectional open innovation setting. We introduce the generalized Nash bargaining solution to allow for unequal bargaining power in ex-post negotiation. As a result, we propose that the party with contracting power releases decision rights depending on its bargaining power. In addition, we propose that the best allocation of decision rights for the maximization of innovation value or the realization of efficient innovation depends on bargaining power and is achieved voluntarily. Lastly, we point out that there are cases in which asymmetric ex-post bargaining power leads to collaboration failure. We conclude that ex-post bargaining power plays a crucial role in influencing the allocation of incentives and the outcomes of open innovation. © The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023.

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