A Causal Power Semantics for Generic Sentences

被引:0
作者
Robert van Rooij
Katrin Schulz
机构
[1] University of Amsterdam,Institute for Logic, Language and Computation
来源
Topoi | 2021年 / 40卷
关键词
Generic sentences; Causality; Semantics; Probability;
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学科分类号
摘要
Many generic sentences express stable inductive generalizations. Stable inductive generalizations are typically true for a causal reason. In this paper we investigate to what extent this is also the case for the generalizations expressed by generic sentences. More in particular, we discuss the possibility that many generic sentences of the form ‘ks have feature e’ are true because (members of) kind k have the causal power to ‘produce’ feature e. We will argue that such an analysis is quite close to a probabilistic based analysis of generic sentences according to which ‘relatively many’ ks have feature e, and that, in fact, this latter type of analysis can be ‘grounded’ in terms of causal powers. We will argue, moreover, that the causal power analysis is sometimes preferred to a correlation-based analysis, because it takes the causal structure that gives rise to the probabilistic data into account.
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页码:131 / 146
页数:15
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