Two extensions of the Shapley value for cooperative games

被引：0

作者：

T. S. H. Driessen

D. Paulusma

机构：

[1] Faculty of Mathematical Sciences,

[2] University of Twente,undefined

[3] P.O.Box 217,undefined

[4] 7500 AE Enschede,undefined

[5] The Netherlands (E-mail: {driessen,undefined

[6] paulusma}@math.utwente.nl),undefined

来源：

Mathematical Methods of Operations Research | 2001年 / 53卷

关键词：

Key words: cooperative game; poset; probability distribution; Shapley value; 1991 Mathematics Subject Classifications: 90D12; 90D40.;

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学科分类号：

摘要：

Two extensions of the Shapley value are given. First we consider a probabilistic framework in which certain consistent allocation rules such as the Shapley value are characterized. The second generalization of the Shapley value is an extension to the structure of posets by means of a recursive form. In the latter setting, the Shapley value for quasi-concave games is shown to be a core-allocation.

引用

页码：35 / 49

页数：14