Conditionals in Theories of Truth

被引：0
作者：
Anil Gupta
Shawn Standefer
机构：
[1] University of Pittsburgh,
[2] University of Melbourne,undefined
来源：
Journal of Philosophical Logic | 2017年 / 46卷
关键词：
Truth; Paradox; Revision theory; Conditionals; Circular definitions;
D O I：
暂无
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
We argue that distinct conditionals—conditionals that are governed by different logics—are needed to formalize the rules of Truth Introduction and Truth Elimination. We show that revision theory, when enriched with the new conditionals, yields an attractive theory of truth. We go on to compare this theory with one recently proposed by Hartry Field.
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收藏
页码：27 / 63
页数：36
相关论文
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