Strategic delay and information cascades

被引：0

作者：

Edward Cartwright

机构：

[1] University of Kent,Department of Economics

来源：

Journal of Economics | 2015年 / 114卷

关键词：

Information cascade; Investment; Endogenous timing; D21; C72; L13;

D O I：

暂无

中图分类号：

学科分类号：

摘要：

In a setting where agents must choose between two investments, Zhang (in RAND J Econ 28:188–205, 1997) proposed an equilibrium in which there is strategic delay. This equilibrium relied upon there being an information cascade. We shall demonstrate that an information cascade need not generally occur. It will only occur if and only if the cost of investing takes relatively extreme values. Taking this into account we derive a revised equilibrium that is still characterized by strategic delay.

引用

页码：63 / 74

页数：11

共 9 条

[1] Bikhchandani S(1998)Learning from the behavior of others: conformity fads, and informational cascades J Econ Perspect 12 151-170
[2] Hirshleifer D(2004)Delays and equilibria with large and small information in social learning Eur Econ Rev 48 477-501
[3] Welch I(2003)On the interplay of informational spillovers and payoff externalities RAND J Econ 34 582-592
[4] Chamley CP(1996)What have we learned from social learning? Eur Econ Rev 40 617-628
[5] Frisell L(1990)Herd behavior and investment Am Econ Rev 80 465-479
[6] Gale D(1997)Strategic delay and the onset of investment cascades RAND J Econ 28 188-205
[7] Scharfstein DS(undefined)undefined undefined undefined undefined-undefined
[8] Stein JC(undefined)undefined undefined undefined undefined-undefined
[9] Zhang J(undefined)undefined undefined undefined undefined-undefined

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