Executive discretion and corporate performance as determinants of CEO compensation, contingent on external monitoring activities

被引：6

作者：

Wright P. ^{[1
]}

Kroll M. ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Fogelman College of Business and Economics, The University of Memphis, Memphis, 38152, TN

[2] College of Administration and Business, Louisiana Tech University, Ruston

来源：

Journal of Management and Governance | 2002年 / 6卷 / 3期

关键词：

CEO compensation; Corporate performance; Executive discretion;

D O I：

10.1023/A:1019676314682

中图分类号：

学科分类号：

摘要：

In this paper we discuss the potential impact of managerial discretion and firm performance on CEO compensation, contingent on the extent of monitoring activities. We argue that CEO compensation may be positively related to executive discretion and corporate performance for firms that have vigilant external monitors.We alternatively contend that CEO compensation may neither be associated with discretion nor performance for firms with passive external monitors. The empirical results are supportive of our contentions. © 2002 Kluwer Academic Publishers.

引用

页码：189 / 214

页数：25

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