Experimental Tests of Self-Selection and Screening in Insurance Decisions

被引：0

作者：

Zur Shapira

Itzhak Venezia

机构：

[1] Stern School of Business,

[2] New York University,undefined

[3] School of Business,undefined

[4] Hebrew University,undefined

来源：

The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory | 1999年 / 24卷

关键词：

self-selection; screening; information asymmetry; insurance markets;

D O I：

暂无

中图分类号：

学科分类号：

摘要：

A major characteristic of insurance markets is information asymmetry that may lead to phenomena such as adverse selection and moral hazard. Another aspect of markets with asymmetric information is self-selection, which refers to the pattern of choices that individuals with different personal characteristics make when facing a menu of contracts or options. To combat problems of asymmetric information, insurance firms can use screening. That is, they can offer the clients a menu of choices and infer their characteristics from their choices.

引用

页码：139 / 158

页数：19