Disjunctivism, contextualism and the sceptical aporia

被引：0
作者：
Lars Bo Gundersen
机构：
[1] University of Aarhus,
来源：
Synthese | 2009年 / 171卷
关键词：
Epistemology; Scepticism; Closure; Transmission; Disjunctivism; Contextualism; Knowledge; Evidence;
D O I：
暂无
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
We know things that entail things we apparently cannot come to know. This is a problem for those of us who trust that knowledge is closed under entailment. In the paper I discuss the solutions to this problem offered by epistemic disjunctivism and contextualism. The contention is that neither of these theories has the resources to deal satisfactory with the problem.
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页码：387 / 397
页数：10
相关论文
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