Circular domains

被引：0
作者：
Shin Sato
机构：
[1] Fukuoka University,Faculty of Economics
来源：
Review of Economic Design | 2010年 / 14卷
关键词：
Circular domain; Essential social choice function; Group strategy-proofness; Strategy-proofness; D71;
D O I：
暂无
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
I introduce the notion of circular domains and prove that on any circular domain there is no strategy-proof and nondictatorial social choice function. Moreover, I show that on any proper subset of a minimal circular domain, there exists a group strategy-proof and essential social choice function. These results together detect the minimal size of the domains over which the incompatibility arises with respect to pairs of democratic-incentive requirements (nondictatorial, strategy-proof) and (essential, group strategy-proof).
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页码：331 / 342
页数：11
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