Correction to “A Strategy-proofness Characterization of Majority Rule”

被引：0
|
作者：
Donald E. Campbell
Jerry S. Kelly
机构：
[1] The College of William and Mary,Department of Economics and The Program in Public Policy
[2] Syracuse University,Department of Economics
来源：
Economic Theory Bulletin | 2016年 / 4卷 / 1期
关键词：
Majority rule; Condorcet rule; Social choice function; Strategy-proofness; D70; D71;
D O I：
10.1007/s40505-015-0066-8
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
In a (Econ. Theory 22:557–568, 2003) paper, Campbell and Kelly correctly stated that if the number of individuals is odd and there are at least three alternatives then a social choice function with full range on the Condorcet domain must always select the majority winner if the rule is non-dictatorial and strategy-proof. This note corrects an error in the proof.
引用
收藏
页码：121 / 124
页数：3
相关论文
共 50 条
  • [31] Stability, Strategy-Proofness, and Cumulative Offer Mechanisms
    Hatfield, John William
    Kominers, Scott Duke
    Westkamp, Alexander
    REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 2021, 88 (03) : 1457 - 1502
  • [32] Strategy-proofness and the core in house allocation problems
    Miyagawa, E
    GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, 2002, 38 (02) : 347 - 361
  • [33] Stability, Strategy-Proofness, and Cumulative Offer Mechanisms
    Hatfield, John William
    Kominers, Scott Duke
    Westkamp, Alexander
    EC'17: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2017 ACM CONFERENCE ON ECONOMICS AND COMPUTATION, 2017, : 673 - 674
  • [34] Characterizing referenda with quorums via strategy-proofness
    Marc Pauly
    Theory and Decision, 2013, 75 : 581 - 597
  • [35] Strategy-proofness and efficiency are incompatible in production economies
    Leroux, J
    ECONOMICS LETTERS, 2004, 85 (03) : 335 - 340
  • [36] A unified approach to strategy-proofness of the deferred-acceptance rule and the top-trading cycles rule
    Anno, Hidekazu
    Takahashi, Sui
    REVIEW OF ECONOMIC DESIGN, 2023, 27 (01) : 133 - 137
  • [37] Preference reversal and strategy-proofness with more than three alternatives
    Rao, K. P. S. Bhaskara
    Basile, Achille
    Rao, Surekha
    ECONOMICS LETTERS, 2021, 208
  • [38] Belief-independence and (robust) strategy-proofness
    Mueller, Michael
    THEORY AND DECISION, 2024, 96 (03) : 443 - 461
  • [39] Oligarchy for social choice correspondences and strategy-proofness
    Tanaka, Y
    THEORY AND DECISION, 2003, 55 (03) : 273 - 287
  • [40] Strategy-Proofness in the Stable Matching Problem with Couples
    Perrault, Andrew
    Drummond, Joanna
    Bacchus, Fahiem
    AAMAS'16: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2016 INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON AUTONOMOUS AGENTS & MULTIAGENT SYSTEMS, 2016, : 132 - 140
12345