Correction to “A Strategy-proofness Characterization of Majority Rule”

被引：0
|
作者：
Donald E. Campbell
Jerry S. Kelly
机构：
[1] The College of William and Mary,Department of Economics and The Program in Public Policy
[2] Syracuse University,Department of Economics
来源：
Economic Theory Bulletin | 2016年 / 4卷 / 1期
关键词：
Majority rule; Condorcet rule; Social choice function; Strategy-proofness; D70; D71;
D O I：
10.1007/s40505-015-0066-8
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
In a (Econ. Theory 22:557–568, 2003) paper, Campbell and Kelly correctly stated that if the number of individuals is odd and there are at least three alternatives then a social choice function with full range on the Condorcet domain must always select the majority winner if the rule is non-dictatorial and strategy-proof. This note corrects an error in the proof.
引用
收藏
页码：121 / 124
页数：3
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