Moral Responsibility, Guilt, and Retributivism

被引：1

作者：

Clarke R. ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Tallahassee, FL

来源：

The Journal of Ethics | 2016年 / 20卷 / 1-3期

关键词：

Blameworthiness; Derk Pereboom; Desert; Gideon Rosen; Guilt; Hilary Bok; Joel Feinberg; Moral responsibility; Retributivism; T; M; Scanlon;

D O I：

10.1007/s10892-016-9228-7

中图分类号：

学科分类号：

摘要：

This paper defends a minimal desert thesis, according to which someone who is blameworthy for something deserves to feel guilty, to the right extent, at the right time, because of her culpability. The sentiment or emotion of guilt includes a thought that one is blameworthy for something as well as an unpleasant affect. Feeling guilty is not a matter of inflicting suffering on oneself, and it need not involve any thought that one deserves to suffer. The desert of a feeling of guilt is a kind of moral propriety of that response, and it is a matter of justice. If the minimal desert thesis is correct, then it is in some respect good that one who is blameworthy feel guilty—there is some justice in that state of affairs. But if retributivism concerns the justification of punishment, the minimal desert thesis is not retributivist. Its plausibility nevertheless raises doubt about whether, as some have argued, there are senses of moral responsibility that are not desert-entailing. © 2016, Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht.

引用

页码：121 / 137

页数：16

共 19 条

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