Non-Factualist Dispositionalism

This paper aims to defend that the best framework for characterizing dispositions is a Rylean, non-factualist dispositionalism. I follow Tugby (Mind, 122 (486), 451–480, 2013) in explaining which are the main candidates for characterizing the ontology of dispositions. Tugby (Mind, 122 (486), 451–480, 2013) concludes that the best metaphysical framework for characterizing dispositions is Platonism, because it is the only theory that can account for the central and the intrinsic platitudes. Following this I show that Platonism (which postulates the existence of non-natural, trascendent universals) is not desirable because it is difficult to reconcile with ontological naturalism and because it is not parsimonious. Thus, I offer a different candidate: Rylean non-factualist dispositionalism. This approach retains the explanatory power of our dispositional vocabulary without appealing to facts, entities, or properties. In conclusion, non-factualist dispositionalism is preferable over naturalism and Platonism for characterizing dispositions.