BIO logical agents: Norms, beliefs, intentions in defeasible logic

被引：0
作者：
Guido Governatori
Antonino Rotolo
机构：
[1] The University of Queensland,School of ITEE
[2] University of Bologna,CIRSFID
来源：
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems | 2008年 / 17卷
关键词：
Defeasible logic; Intention and obligation; Agent types; Social agents; Computational complexity;
D O I：
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中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
In this paper we follow the BOID (Belief, Obligation, Intention, Desire) architecture to describe agents and agent types in Defeasible Logic. We argue, in particular, that the introduction of obligations can provide a new reading of the concepts of intention and intentionality. Then we examine the notion of social agent (i.e., an agent where obligations prevail over intentions) and discuss some computational and philosophical issues related to it. We show that the notion of social agent either requires more complex computations or has some philosophical drawbacks.
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页码：36 / 69
页数：33
相关论文
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