Board Accountability and Risk Taking in Banking: Evidence from a Quasi-Experiment

被引：0
作者：
Tobias Körner
机构：
[1] German Council of Economic Experts c/o Federal Statistical Office,
来源：
Journal of Financial Services Research | 2017年 / 52卷
关键词：
Corporate governance; Outside directors; Legal liability; Bank risk; G21; G38; K20;
D O I：
暂无
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
In this paper, a law reform is evaluated that aimed at improving the corporate governance of banks by tightening accountability and legal liability of outside directors. The causal effect of the reform on bank risk is identified by difference-in-differences and triple differences strategies. The estimation results show that banks subject to the reform increased capital and liquidity ratios. Hence, designing board-level governance can be an effective policy tool for altering the risk-taking behavior of banks.
引用
收藏
页码：155 / 190
页数：35
相关论文
共 37 条
  • [1] Adams RB(2012)Governance and the financial crisis Int Rev Finance 12 7-38
  • [2] Adams RB(2008)Do directors perform for pay? J Account Econ 46 154-171
  • [3] Ferreira D(2012)The credit crisis around the globe: why did some banks perform better? J Financ Econ 105 1-17
  • [4] Beltratti A(2006)Outside director liability across countries Texas Law Rev 84 1384-1480
  • [5] Stulz RM(2006)Outside director liability Stanf Law Rev 58 1055-1160
  • [6] Black BS(2015)Outside director stock options and dividend policy J Financ Serv Res 47 381-410
  • [7] Cheffins BR(2011)Corporate governance and the cost of debt: evidence from director limited liability and indemnification provisions J Corp Financ 17 83-107
  • [8] Black BS(2014)The non-monotonic effect of board independence and credit ratings J Financ Serv Res 45 145-171
  • [9] Cheffins BR(2012)Corporate governance, opaque bank activities, and risk/return efficiency: pre- and post-crisis evidence from Turkey J Financ Serv Res 41 51-80
  • [10] Klausner M(2007)Financial fraud, director reputation, and shareholder wealth J Financ Econ 86 306-336
1234