The Research Domain Criteria (RDoC) project is an ambitious new initiative by the National Institute of Mental Health that aims to comprehensively redefine mental illnesses as problems of neurogenetic ‘circuitry’. This essay explores potential implications of this nascent approach. Drawing on data from two studies that examine the diagnosis of autism spectrum disorder, itself recently reconceptualized along lines similar to this new diagnostic paradigm, I argue that such ‘circuit disorders’ differ from their predecessors in two significant ways. First, while psychiatric disease entities under the previous paradigm were understood as fundamentally separable from the affected person, circuit disorders are bound up in intimate neuropsychological processes such as memory, perception and desire; they are thus often experienced as constitutive of identity by those living under their description. Second, rather than being limited to matters of ‘clinically significant impairment’, circuit disorders are multivalent, encompassing valued as well as devalued traits. Given that one major aim of the RDoC is to allow for pre-emptive biomedical intervention upon pre-symptomatic states, these emergent qualities of circuit disorders raise complex ethical concerns. I conclude by illustrating the way these concerns become obscured in the transition to an ostensibly value-neutral biophysiological paradigm.
