Perspectival Direct Reference for Proper Names

被引:0
作者
Ralph William Clark
机构
[1] West Virginia University,Philosophy Department, Stansbury Hall
来源
Philosophia | 2011年 / 39卷
关键词
Direct reference; Kripke; Proper names; Perceptual perspectives; Empty names;
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学科分类号
摘要
I defend what I believe to be a new variation on Kripkean themes, for the purpose of providing an improved way to understand the referring functions of proper names. I begin by discussing roles played by perceptual perspectives in the use of proper names, and then broaden the discussion to include what I call “cognitive perspectives.” Although both types of perspectives underwrite the existence of intentional intermediaries between proper names and their referents, the existence of these intentional intermediaries does not entail that a Kripke-inspired view of direct reference must be abandoned. At the same time, the existence of these intermediaries can be seen to play illuminating roles as regards the referring functions of proper names in the following types of cases, among others: (a) where different names pick out the same subject; (b) where names are empty. Along the way, I argue that “perspectival views” are not something “inside the head” of language users as intended by Putnam in his well-known discussion of meaning.
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页码:251 / 265
页数:14
相关论文
共 2 条
[1]  
Bealer G(2004)An inconsistency in direct reference theory The Journal of Philosophy 0111 574-593
[2]  
Le Morvan P(2004)Arguments against direct realism and how to counter them American Philosophical Quarterly 41 221-234