Simple Hyperintensional Belief Revision

被引：0
作者：
F. Berto
机构：
[1] University of Amsterdam,Department of Philosophy, Institute for Logic, Language and Computation (ILLC)
来源：
Erkenntnis | 2019年 / 84卷
关键词：
Framing effects; Hyperintensionality; Belief revision; Non-monotonic reasoning; Doxastic logic; Epistemic logic; Inconsistent belief management;
D O I：
暂无
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
I present a possible worlds semantics for a hyperintensional belief revision operator, which reduces the logical idealization of cognitive agents affecting similar operators in doxastic and epistemic logics, as well as in standard AGM belief revision theory. (Revised) belief states are not closed under classical logical consequence; revising by inconsistent information does not perforce lead to trivialization; and revision can be subject to ‘framing effects’: logically or necessarily equivalent contents can lead to different revisions. Such results are obtained without resorting to non-classical logics, or to non-normal or impossible worlds semantics. The framework combines, instead, a standard semantics for propositional S5 with a simple mereology of contents.
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收藏
页码：559 / 575
页数：16
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