Industry concentration and strategic trade policy in successive oligopoly

被引：3
作者：
Nese G. [1 ]
Straume O.R. [2 ,3 ]
机构：
[1] Institute for Research in Economics and Business Administration, 5045 Bergen
[2] Department of Economics, School of Economics and Management, University of Minho, 4710-057 Braga, Campus de Gualtar
[3] NIPE, School of Economics and Management, University of Minho, 4710-057 Braga, Campus de Gualtar
来源：
Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade | 2007年 / 7卷 / 1期
关键词：
Industry concentration; Strategic trade policy; Successive oligopoly;
D O I：
10.1007/s10842-006-0001-7
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
We study a policy game between exporting and importing countries in vertically linked industries. In a successive international Cournot oligopoly, we analyse incentives for using tax instruments strategically to shift rents vertically, between exporting and importing countries, and horizontally, between exporting countries. We show that the equilibrium outcome depends crucially on the relative degree of competitiveness in the upstream and downstream parts of the industry. With respect to national welfare, a more competitive upstream industry may benefit an exporting (upstream) country and harm an importing (downstream) country. On the other hand, a more competitive downstream industry may harm exporting countries. © Springer Science + Business Media, LLC 2007.
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页码：31 / 52
页数：21
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