Doxastic justification through dispositions to cause

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作者
Julius Schönherr
机构
[1] Peking University,Institute of Foreign Philosophy, Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies
来源
Synthese | / 200卷
关键词
The basing relation; Doxastic Justification; Disposition; Belief;
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摘要
According to the standard view, a belief is based on a reason and doxastically justified—i.e., permissibly held—only if a causal relation obtains between a reason and the belief. In this paper, I argue that a belief can be doxastically justified by a reason’s mere disposition to sustain it. Such a disposition, however, wouldn’t establish a causal connection unless it were manifested. My argument is that, in the cases I have in mind, the manifestation of this disposition would add no positive epistemic feature to the belief: a belief that is justified after the manifestation of a reason’s causal powers must have already been justified before their manifestation. As a result, those who adhere to the standard causal view of the basing relation face a hard choice: they should either abandon the enormously popular view that doxastic justification has a basing requirement or modify their view of the basing relation.
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