Consumption taxes in monopolistic competition: a comment

被引:0
作者
Henrik Vetter
机构
[1] Statsbiblioteket,
[2] Universitetsparken,undefined
来源
Journal of Economics | 2013年 / 110卷
关键词
Unit taxes; Ad valorem taxes; Monopolistic competition; Mark-up pricing; H22; D43;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
学科分类号
摘要
We show that an ad valorem tax is better than an equal-revenue unit tax when consumers spend some fixed proportion of income on taxed goods, when firms use constant mark-up pricing, and entry and exit drive per-firm profit to zero. These key assumptions implies that ad valorem taxes are superior in oligopoly as well as monopolistic competition, showing that earlier results on taxes in monopolistic competition (Schröder in J Econ 83(3):281–292, 2004) are not due to the mode of competition, but rather are due to the functional forms used.
引用
收藏
页码:287 / 295
页数:8
相关论文
共 22 条
  • [1] Anderson SP(2001)Tax incidence in differentiated product oligopoly J Public Econ 81 173-192
  • [2] de Palma A(2001)The efficiency of indirect taxes under imperfect competition J Public Econ 81 231-251
  • [3] Kreider B(1992)The comparison between ad-valorem and specific taxation under imperfect competition J Public Econ 49 351-367
  • [4] Anderson SP(1977)Monopolistic competition and optimum product diversity Am Econ Rev 67 297-308
  • [5] de Palma A(2009)The welfare comparison of corrective ad valorem and unit taxes under monopolistic competition Int Tax Public Finance 16 164-175
  • [6] Kreider B(1986)Mark-up pricing over the business cycle: the microfoundations of the variable mark-up Southern Econ J 53 233-246
  • [7] Delipalla S(2009)Excise taxes with multiproduct transactions Am Econ Rev 99 458-471
  • [8] Keen M(2012)Optimal taxation with monopolistic competition Int Tax Public Finance 19 216-236
  • [9] Dixit AK(2004)The comparison between ad valorem and unit taxes under monopolistic competition J Econ 83 281-292
  • [10] Stiglitz JE(2010)Ad valorem versus unit taxes: monopolistic competition, heterogeneous firms, and intra-industry reallocations J Econ 101 247-265